Lunar Resources: Beyond the Fringe

A new, somewhat philosophical post up at Air & Space on the recent Royal Astronomical Society meeting in London on using space resources.  By the way, that great, appropriate title (alluding to the British comedy group) was a suggestion of my editor at Air & Space, Tony Reichhardt.  Thanks, Tony!

The meeting in London was a good one, with lots of interesting presentations.  Comments on the post are welcome.

On another note, I will be on The Space Show this coming Sunday (May 1, 2016) at 2:00 pm Central time, discussing my new book, The Value of the Moon.  Feel free to listen and call in the show with questions or comments.

Posted in Lunar development, planetary exploration, space industry, space policy, space technology, Space transportation | 13 Comments

Organizational Whiplash: Why NASA Needs A Change in Direction

We all want progress, but if you’re on the wrong road, progress means doing an about-turn and walking back to the right road; in that case, the man who turns back soonest is the most progressive. – C. S. Lewis

NASA’s “Journey to Mars” – Oh, what a tangled web we weave…

NASA’s “Journey to Mars” – Oh, what a tangled web we weave…

Administrator Charles Bolden, seeking to sway future national space policy as we approach a post-Obama NASA, pressed the point that the agency’s current path is just fine and that he doesn’t want anyone interfering with “progress” made under his leadership. A variety of published opinion seconds that narrative, noting that constantly changing the emphasis and direction of a program generally leads to no progress at all.

In order to accept these judgments, one must agree that the general direction and well being of the agency is a positive one. I would argue just the reverse. The complete lack of strategic vision currently extant in our civil space program has led to organizational chaos and inexorable decline. Questions about the lack of clear direction, the articulation of intermediate milestones, and the absence of any roadmap for accomplishment dominate Congressional hearings and inquiries, and the writings of informed observers. Bolden’s complaint about the doleful effects of “shifting gears” for NASA is disingenuous, as a hard-won, bipartisan consensus for strategic direction in civil space was cavalierly discarded in 2010.

Let us pause from these philosophical ponderings for a moment and consider the current status of the American civil space program. The International Space Station is operating at full capacity, even though we must procure our access to it from the Russians. Six years after its initiation, the so-called “Commercial Crew” program has yet to fly a single test article (the crewed Dragon is not the same vehicle as the cargo carrier). Research on the ISS focuses primarily on life and materials science, with little engineering experimentation on deep spaceflight technology being conducted. Such research would be relevant to future NASA activities, but leadership is lacking.

We’re told that the overall strategic direction of NASA is a human mission to Mars, memorably typified by the Internet hashtag #JourneytoMars, carrying with it all the semblance of reality that such a designation implies. There’s been no revision to the Mars Design Reference Mission (current version, DRM 5.0, dated July 2009) or even a vague articulation of general principles for a mission design. That architecture employed elements of unobtainium, such as a nuclear thermal rocket. We’ve had promotion of the “testing ground” concept for deep space human missions in cislunar space, but no concrete mission plans beyond the heavily criticized “Asteroid Redirect Mission” (formerly “Asteroid Retrieval Mission,” but always the ARM), designed to deflect public attention away from the fact that no real plan for human spaceflight beyond LEO exists.

The ARM is cloaked in the façade of “technology development,” with specific reference to the need for development of the solar electric propulsion (SEP) – the current bag of magic beans that allegedly will carry us to Mars. In reality, SEP is already a well-developed technology (the asteroid mission Dawn uses it) and one need not haul a space rock to develop something already in use. In truth, SEP could be employed to transport cargo throughout cislunar space and for use on the Moon. Simply put, the tyranny of the rocket equation rules, so all spaceflight and human missions to Mars require that thousands of tons of mass be sent at high velocities along precisely calculated paths. No technical solution, short of anti-gravity, can cut this Gordian Knot.

But more than simply lacking a means of how to get there, no one has yet to articulate a viable reason for the journey. There are numerous vague assertions that we are searching for martian life or preparing to “place life there” (by colonization), but the first rationale is hardly enough to justify a 50-year, trillion dollar federal program and the latter is sheer fantasy. What will humans on Mars do? Explore? Great, but then what? Public appetites for the new and exciting are easily and quickly satiated. Some long-term benefit is needed to justify the levels of expenditure human Mars missions require. Perhaps there are useful minerals to mine on Mars or some other product of significant financial value, but at the moment, we have no idea if, where, or how they might occur. Colonists must do something with their time, and simply surviving is not enough to justify it as the ultimate goal (although that will be the principal preoccupation of early Mars settlers). Besides, there is the issue of whether “colonization” is an appropriate function of a government-run space program.

Should other NASA activities become the new focus of the agency? Although there is a widespread notion that unmanned (robotic) missions are the “jewel in the crown” of the agency, we are in fact reaching a point of diminishing returns in that arena as well. With the reconnaissance of the Solar System largely complete (we have sent missions to all the planets, including asteroids and comets), the focus of new robotic planetary missions is on answering increasingly detailed – and increasingly arcane – scientific questions. These new generations of spacecraft are both more capable and more expensive. Yet such missions produce information that is much less comprehensible to the taxpaying public. The James Webb Space Telescope – at a cost of almost $10 billion – is likely to be the last of the large space-based astronomical facilities. Monitoring of the Earth’s environment from space is an agency activity that has become increasingly politicized over the past few years, generating much ill will throughout the communities involved. This area is likely to become more, not less, contentious over time. Aeronautics is a minor activity and will continue to be unremarkable, in both budget and accomplishment.

Yet we are being told to “stay the course.”

NASA supporters usually mean this phrase in a relatively restricted sense. They claim that with the Orion and SLS development coming along reasonably well, those programs should be kept funded and on track. Given that the alternatives amount to nothing, it’s not an unreasonable calculus. But both projects need something to do and someplace to go. Given their origins as vehicles designed to enable human flights within cislunar space, this is the logical arena in which to operate. But in this case, the “where” leaves begging the question of the “what?” Besides the ARM, it has been proposed to develop a cislunar “habitat” to be deployed somewhere in the vicinity of the Moon. But what shall we do there? A small habitat in deep space, outside the van Allen radiation belts of the Earth, will be exposed to both galactic cosmic rays and (potentially fatal) coronal mass ejections from the Sun. Such a vehicle will need some type of significant shielding for long-term habitation.

Of course, the obvious answer to the problem of what to do is to return to the surface of the Moon and develop its resources to enable more distant space goals. But under the current regime, it has been decreed that such thinking is not permitted within the agency. (Although there is no formal written policy stating this, my sources attest to its reality nonetheless.) This discouragement of any logical thinking appears to be solely in response to the absurd decree by President Obama in 2010 that there was no need to go to the Moon because “we’ve been there.”

A blatantly misdirected policy program compels us to change course. Why choose to remain idle instead of re-vectoring back to the more promising path? The “Journey to Mars” is a fraud and commercial human spaceflight has yet to take off (and, there is reason to suspect that such endeavor is far distant). So we are left – not simply with nothing, but worse than nothing – a “nothing” that is being marketed as having value and being imminent. The next administration might appoint another “blue-ribbon commission” to review our space program, but the last time that was done, it was a policy disaster. We were on a perfectly acceptable and useful track in the development of human spaceflight eight years ago. We still have the pieces needed to pick up where we left off and head back to the Moon. And there, we will learn how to explore, live and prosper in space using the resources of the Moon.

Posted in Lunar development, Lunar exploration, planetary exploration, space policy, space technology, Space transportation | 57 Comments

2016 Columbia Medal of the American Society of Civil Engineers

Yesterday, while I was 38,000 feet above the Atlantic on the way home from London, I was to have received the 2016 American Society of Civil Engineers Columbia Medal.  I am very honored to receive this award and note with awe the company of past recipients of this medal.

To quote directly from the award letter,

You have been selected by the Aerospace Division of the American Society of Civil Engineers to receive the 2016 Columbia Medal For outstanding service as a geologist specializing in the terrestrial planets, with extensive background in geology and planetary science, including interpretation of remote-sensing and image data and integrated studies with information from planetary samples.  In selecting you for this award, the committee particularly noted your contributions that advance aerospace engineering.

I knew that I would be out of the country during the meeting and thus, unable to accept the award in person, so I prepared a short acceptance and technical talk video to play at the meeting.  I have posted this video on YouTube.  Comments and feedback are welcome.

Also, next Tuesday (April 19, 2016) is the publication date of my new book The Value of the Moon: How to Explore, Live and Prosper in Space Using the Moon’s Resources.  It is a history, a memoir and an advocacy of using the Moon to create new space capabilities.  Blogging has been light because of my attention to this and other matters, but with the book launch accomplished, I should soon be back to writing those wonderful commentaries that you have come to know and love.

Posted in Lunar development, Lunar exploration, space industry, space policy, space technology, Space transportation | 22 Comments

Stability and Instability in Space

Congressman John Culberson (R-TX) testifies on his proposed bill to reorganize NASA.

Congressman John Culberson (R-TX 7) testifies on his proposed bill to reorganize NASA.

The House Space Subcommittee held two hearings on the U.S. civil space program in February – one where the strategic direction of the human spaceflight effort was discussed, and a second one dealing with the configuration of NASA as an executing entity for such policy. The somewhat understated subtext of both of these hearings is that our space program currently lacks coherency and strategic direction. In partial response to this state of affairs, Rep. John Culberson of Texas has proposed legislation (the Space Leadership Preservation Act of 2015) to try and resolve some of these operational difficulties – legislation designed to reconfigure the existing interface between NASA and the executive and legislative branches of government. Many have given considerable thought as to why this bill is necessary and why it could be a solution to our ongoing space policy chaos.

It is clear from much of the discussion at these two hearings that despite repeated claims by the agency, no one believes that we are truly on a “#JourneytoMars.” This situation is in part technical, in that NASA does not have a well-defined architecture, or even a roadmap, to develop the technology to conduct such a mission. For example, the Asteroid Retrieval Mission (ARM) is widely recognized as a pointless distraction. But equally significant is that by repeatedly over-promising with rhetoric and under-delivering on actual spaceflight capability, the current incarnation of the agency has little political or programmatic credibility.

The basic source of our dilemma comes from the decision made by the administration in 2010 to unilaterally terminate Project Constellation (yet retain the planned retirement of the Space Shuttle) and to remove the Moon from the path of deep space human spaceflight – for essentially trivial and specious reasons (“We’ve been there!”). Congress had twice endorsed the 2004 Vision for Space Exploration in two separate authorizations – one while under control of the Republicans (2006) and one while under Democratic control (2008). This made at least the general exploratory path of “Moon-then-Mars” a bipartisan consensus, something rare and remarkable in Washington. True enough, the Constellation architecture had run into some technical (and hence, fiscal) difficulties, but none that couldn’t be solved. In any event, it was still possible in 2009 (when Obama took office) to adjust the architecture (in terms of funding, schedule and implementation) without throwing out the hard fought for and won consensus on strategic direction that the previous two authorizations represented.

Instead, the VSE was discarded and replaced with (essentially) nothing. Sure, there was talk about “flexible paths” and “asteroid missions” but nothing came of either idea. Although the Flexible Path was deceptive (a recipe for widget-making and strategic confusion), the possibility of a human mission to an asteroid was seriously examined – and found to be wanting. In essence, the problem is that the Orion spacecraft (the only piece of the Constellation spacecraft left intact) is designed primarily for weeks-long duration cislunar missions, not for missions to an asteroid, which last for many months. When no near-Earth asteroid suitable for a human mission was found, the agency substituted a gimmicky plan to retrieve an asteroid and bring it back into cislunar space, there to be accessible by the spacecraft that we were still building (but not for its original intended purpose). But it could be said that we’d be flying beyond LEO, approaching an asteroid, examining it by humans who would then be able to bring a piece of it back to Earth.

In order to give the impression that a long-term direction was being pursued, NASA re-embraced (again) human Mars missions as their “ultimate goal.” This gambit retread has two advantages: 1) it simulates continuity, as Mars had always been assumed to be the eventual destination for human missions; and 2) it is so far into the future that no one need worry about how to do it or figure out how to pay for it – the perfect government program. A space goal that is more than two decades away might as well be non-existent. In such a situation, any space activity, no matter how idiotic or worthless, can be rationalized as a step within a “technology roadmap” that would eventually enable us to achieve that “ultimate goal.” A long-range plan with no specifics is infinitely malleable; no one can prove that the ARM is not relevant to future Mars missions. This ludicrous situation has been carefully re-packaged by NASA – along with a large helping of public relations glitz – into their current “#JourneytoMars” campaign, a hodge-podge of real hardware and fake missions, with a thick icing of Hollywood schmaltz (The Martian).

This very real and dismal state of affairs is the kind of situation targeted by Culberson’s bill. In his plan, both the President and Congress would appoint eleven members to a “Board of Directors.” This board would meet quarterly to review NASA’s progress and recommend changes or shifts in emphasis. The board would consist of space professionals – people who work, or who have worked, in the area of space science and engineering (with the idea that these members would be qualified to understand, judge and pronounce on technical merits of a given spaceflight proposal). The board would also conduct special studies and reviews on any topic about which the Congress or administration had particular concerns.

Along with having advisory oversight, the Board of Directors would have considerable influence over the program. Specifically, the board would be responsible for helping to select the agency Administrator (and Deputy), who would serve a ten-year term of office. This selection would come from a list of nominees provided by the Board to the President. Presumably, this arrangement would assure that the Administrator would be technically knowledgeable enough to steer the agency onto the right tactical path once a strategic direction had been articulated, with special attention given to seeing that they remain on the planned path. Interestingly, the proposed legislation also provides that the board can recommend the Administrator’s “removal for cause” – for being unresponsive and/or ineffective. This provision in no way eliminates the ability of a President to fire an existing administrator for reasons of their own. In addition, the Board would have one other significant power – it would devise a yearly recommended budget for the agency, independent of the one drawn up by the administration’s own Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Both budgets would be submitted to the Congress for consideration, with the executive required to explain any differences that exist between the two.

This last provision is quite interesting and no doubt could be the source of a lot of mischief, depending upon how Congress reacts to the possible submission of two wildly divergent budgets. A memorable moment came during Thursday’s hearing (1:19:30 of this video) when former NASA Administrator Mike Griffin stated: “Anything that can be done to ameliorate and control the influence of the OMB on the process would be welcome. The OMB is a haven for largely unelected, unappointed, not very well qualified staff who seek to exercise a level of power and control in their area that their accomplishments have not earned.” Griffin’s pointed statement is indicative of some unhealed wounds from past battles between parts of the administration and the agency.

The intent of the proposed law is to insulate the agency from some of the more devastating political winds of change – assuring that strategic decisions are made for good technical reasons. Since the new arrangement reduces the power that the executive holds over NASA, they will likely oppose it. In part, the desire and purpose of the bill is to make NASA a less political agency, similar to the FBI, whose Director is also appointed for a 10-year term and is not directly tied to a given administration. But it is also desired that good scientific and technical oversight be brought to the agency, a proposition I am sympathetic to, having recommended in the 2004 Aldridge report the re-establishment of the National Space Council, a White House group designed to watch over and make sure that NASA properly implements a chosen strategic direction.

Our current mess has deep roots and complex causes, but is largely the result of unilateral action taken by an administration that, without consultation, discarded a strategic direction that Congress had collectively agreed upon. At the hearing, Griffin commented that the 2006 and 2008 authorizations were “good strategic plans” and wondered why Congress did not act when the President casually eliminated them. In point of fact, the 2010 NASA authorization reiterated the goals of the VSE, specifically mentioning the critical role of cislunar space, including the lunar surface. This direction was ignored by the agency, wherein it became a thought-crime to even mention any possibility of human crews going to the lunar surface. In the subsequent rough-and-tumble of operational plans being submitted to Congress, that defiance of the “return to the lunar surface” mandate was papered over and lost in the subsequent noise of everyday government operations.

Culberson’s proposal is interesting in many ways. It would provide some needed technical oversight to the agency and spread the political responsibility for success (or failure) on a few more shoulders. I would be surprised if this proposal was accepted by the administration, seeing as how it would reduce their power and decision-making role. But the bill is a good point of departure for a debate on how to structure and conduct a realistic, cumulative, multi-decadal program in a government dominated by short-term, political battles. The NASA of the Apollo-era worked because there was an agreed national purpose to human spaceflight. The idea of national purpose no longer prevails, as battles and debates over Moon vs. Mars, human vs. robotic, and government vs. private are perforce ideological and thus, eventually political. I will be watching with interest as Rep. John Culberson’s Space Leadership Preservation Act of 2015 bill moves though the Congress.

Posted in Lunar exploration, space policy, space technology, Space transportation | 36 Comments

Mysterious Moon Sounds

I have a new post up at Air & Space discussing the recent flurry of news stories concerning the old “music of the spheres” chestnut about strange sounds heard in lunar orbit.  The coverage seemed a bit too credulous for my tastes.  Comment here if you wish.

Posted in Lunar exploration, Lunar Science, space technology | 10 Comments

Charting a Course in Human Exploration

Testifying to the House Space Subcommittee on February 3, 2016.

Testifying to the House Space Subcommittee on February 3, 2016.  I’m the guy on the far right.

I had the honor of testifying to Congress again this week.  The hearing was before the House Subcommittee on Space and was entitled, “Charting a Course: Expert Perspectives on NASA’s Human Exploration Proposals.”  Although I will have some more detailed thoughts on this event later, I post here the links to the hearing web site, the charter, and my testimony.

Hearing website

Hearing Charter

Spudis testimony

Video of hearing

Posted in Lunar development, Lunar exploration, space policy, space technology, Space transportation | 28 Comments

Reusable Launch Vehicles and Lunar Return

I have a new post up at Air & Space with some follow-on thoughts on the the long-term significance of SpaceX’s recent recovery of the Falcon 9 first stage.  Comment here if desired.

Posted in Lunar development, space industry, space policy, space technology, Space transportation | 31 Comments

SpaceX’s Accomplishment

Space Shuttle Main Engines at the Cape -- reusable, but constant maintenance required. (NASA)

Space Shuttle Main Engines at the Cape — reusable, but constant maintenance required. (NASA)

The carnival sideshow that is our national manned space program continues apace. These past few months we’ve watched as the space “community” swooned over a movie depicting an astronaut forced by circumstance to innovate and survive alone on Mars. Nothing wrong with that, except for the reaction of a federal agency that imagines they are about to realize this future, a fantasy perhaps taken to heart after seeing their logo plastered all over the film’s stage equipment. Next, we were presented with a long interview with Elon Musk, who pontificated on his “plan” to create a sustainable human colony on Mars – in his lifetime. He was serious. And his remarks were taken seriously.

The latest entry in the parade of notable space “events,” is what some would have us believe heralds the advent of a new era in space transportation, one ushered in by the arrival of a “reusable launch vehicle system.” This comes after the first successful return and landing of the SpaceX Falcon 9 first stage to its launch site. The space press, along with cable and network news, trumpeted this news with great fanfare. But does this event truly signal the beginning of a new paradigm for spaceflight? I submit that the real issue to address about reusable launch systems is not whether it can be done, but if it can be done and make economic sense. And that issue is not settled.

A launch system is much more than the rockets that we see leave from (or return to) the pad. A launch system embodies a design and operations concept, the necessary manufacturing infrastructure and supply chain to fabricate the vehicles, the facilities for launch preparation and operations, and the cost and difficulty of refurbishing and then reusing the vehicle. “Reusable” does not necessarily translate to “cheap” – the Space Shuttle was a reusable launch system. The reason Shuttle was expensive is that it took thousands of man-hours, work done by highly skilled (and highly paid) people, to refurbish and prepare the vehicle for each flight. These efforts involved more than repairing damage to the delicate thermal protection system (the famous tiles that covered the Shuttle body) and to the windows (actually more labor intensive than work on the thermal tiles). A great deal of time was spent servicing the Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSME), which had to be removed from the vehicle, serviced (often with disassembly and complete replacement of major components, such as the nozzle or turbopump) and then re-assembled for the next flight.

SpaceX is taking the right approach to building a reusable launch system in that the first stage is the easiest part of an expendable vehicle to retrieve. It travels the least distance and is accelerated to slower speeds than any other part of the rocket. Bringing the first stage back to land is also a plus, in that it greatly simplifies vehicle retrieval and eliminates the corrosive effects of seawater on the engines. However, these benefits come with costs – a first stage capable of flying back to the launch site cannot lift as much payload as an expendable stage. This performance hit comes from the additional mass of the landing system (in the case of Falcon 9, retractable legs) along with propellant needed to decelerate the vehicle to a soft touchdown on its return to the launch site – fuel that cannot be used to push the payload into orbit.

Additionally, there is the cost of the design and testing of the retrieval system. Because SpaceX is a non-public company, we have no idea how much money was spent developing this first stage recovery system. But these costs, plus the others listed above, must be rolled into the price of any new Falcon 9 launch. We can’t know what savings are realized by this effort until the price that SpaceX charges for a Falcon 9 launch drops (and we know by how much). The largest new cost to SpaceX – the cost to operate a hypothetical reusable Falcon 9 launch system – is unknowable now because SpaceX doesn’t yet have one. Certainly the successful landing of a Falcon 9 first stage booster is an accomplishment, but we do not know if such an event is routine or singular, what resources are needed to achieve it, and the impact such retrieval will have on the operating costs of the Falcon 9 system. It is not yet the revolution in space transportation being claimed by New Space cheerleaders and many in the space media, who are quick to circulate SpaceX press releases and throw-away interview comments, but slow to do any objective, in-depth technical research and analysis on what progress is being made and what it all means for the future of space travel and access.

The next step in developing a reusable Falcon 9 launch system is to refurbish a first stage and schedule it for another flight. That won’t happen immediately – apparently, this hardware will be kept on the ground, no doubt to be enshrined for posterity in a forthcoming museum. But this step is crucial – if it is found that preparing the recovered first stage for reuse costs more than building a new flight item, the system won’t pay for itself. To give but one example of a possible difficulty, it may turn out that at least some of the nine Merlin engines contained in the Falcon 9 first stage will need to be disassembled and extensively serviced after each flight. This was true for the SSMEs of the Shuttle, which underwent major servicing every 2-3 flights. While it is assumed that these costs will be less than the replacement cost of an expendable system, it won’t be known for certain until it has been done several dozen times. If a catastrophic failure is experienced during some future flight of a reused stage, launch insurance premiums will increase for the system (as they should) and these costs will need to be rolled into the price of space access. Look for the EPA to add a surcharge for something (or several somethings).

After the Space Shuttle’s first flight (1981), news stories were reporting on the advent of a “New Space Age,” of reusable rockets and routine access to orbit. As the program proceeded we realized that vehicle processing was a much more labor-intensive system than had been anticipated. Both expected and unexpected problems were identified and dealt with, at considerable cost. The determining factor as to whether this recent event is a genuine advancement or not, is if SpaceX can put a payload into orbit and charge significantly less than what they are currently getting – something we won’t know for a considerable time. After a single booster flies five or six times, and the price for launching a satellite comes down, then perhaps we can judge whether this is the great accomplishment its promoters claim it to be.

In the mean time, our inexorable “Journey to Mars” continues….

Posted in space industry, space policy, space technology, Space transportation | 66 Comments

Simulating Human Space Missions

I have a new post up at Air & Space discussing the various simulations undertaken to prepare for future human space missions. Comment here if desired.

Posted in Lunar exploration, planetary exploration | 33 Comments

The New Space Resources Law – Close But No Cigar

Mining the Solar System -- does the new law make this more or less likely? (from

Mining the Solar System — does the new law make this more or less likely? (from

There’s some over-the-top commentary in the space press on the new “commercial space” bill just signed into law (The U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, H.R. 2262). In particular, the law is touted as “… the single greatest recognition of property rights in history” by Eric Anderson, Co-Founder and Co-Chairman of Planetary Resources Inc. , a company created to mine near-Earth asteroids. Now, thanks to this Congress and President, the unimaginable wealth of the universe has been dropped into our laps.


The actual section of the bill dealing with space resources (Title IV) is quite short and somewhat perfunctory. It defines a space resource (and that term is used: space resources not “asteroid” resources) as “an abiotic (non-biological) resource in situ in outer space.” Thus, the materials of planetary-sized objects (other than the Earth) are apparently covered, including lunar polar ice. The bill prescribes that the President shall “facilitate,” “discourage the creation of barriers to,” and “promote” commerce in-space resources, all very commendable (though vague) but also all acting under “appropriate Federal agencies.” So, if anyone thought that this bill would suddenly unleash a new gold rush, it will be one taken under careful bureaucratic supervision.

The best part of the bill comes in Section 51303, which essentially states that what you harvest from space, you own, along with the appropriate rights to keep, use, sell or trade it to any entity. This is a good thing, but arguably, we had this right already. Or did we? Was it arguable previously that we did not have this right, and that now, with a stroke of the pen, we do have it? What has changed?

A big sticking point remaining is that while the advent of this law may make New Space entrepreneurs feel better, it does not resolve the questionable international legal status of space resource utilization. The United States is not a signatory to the infamous 1979 Moon Treaty, which places lunar resources (and by extension, asteroid resources) under international “community” ownership. The Senate refused to ratify the Moon Treaty, but we are signatories to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which bars any territorial claim in space by any nation. Proponents of space resource utilization have long surmised that private claims on resources are not forbidden by this treaty; but individuals are subject to the laws of nations of which they are citizens, so a space miner could find himself in possession of a small asteroid, while at the same time have his terrestrial assets seized through some legal process or claim.

We have gotten along fine without this law for the last 50 years, largely because no commercial entity is anywhere close to actually accessing and using an off-Earth resource. Now that we’re sitting around twiddling our thumbs in space and drooling over the advent of entrepreneurial exploitation of space resources, companies and advocacy groups loudly and persistently call for government action and laws to “make it so.” But one can imagine a variety of circumstances in which this law will make no difference whatsoever. If a private company engaged in some activity that involved exploitation of an extraterrestrial resource of limited extent (e.g., a rich deposit of ice on the Moon near permanent sunlight) and their possession of that resource was challenged by some nation-state present nearby, how might the American government react? Presumably, peaceful diplomatic means would be pursued at first, but then when they can’t-don’t-won’t agree, then what?

The U.S. federal government guarantees the rights of American citizens (including corporations) to their property and is responsible for resolving conflicts. Often conflicts escalate to higher levels, up to and including stalemates (that block free enterprise) and confrontations that decide the outcome. Would the United States go to war over a dispute involving space resources that some company might have with another nation? I don’t know, but I suspect that the answer is no – and other countries (and investors) will know this.

There are many reasons I advocate a return to the Moon as our next national goal in space and one reason, not often considered, is the establishment of an American right of access to space and its resources. The U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, despite appearances, does not establish this right. Laws that we pass are not binding on other nations or entities outside the boundaries of the United States. Ultimately, future disputes (and make no mistake, there will be some, despite the best intentions of all parties) must be settled between entities of comparable status and between their parent nations. Thus, I contend that we must have “skin in the game” at an international level, not only at the corporate one.

Declaring the rights of our citizens to find and exploit space resources is one thing; defending that right in a potentially hostile world is another. In the same way that ships operated under American registry are protected by the diplomatic, economic and military power of the American government, future space businesses will look to their government (as they must and have a right to) to protect their rights, enforce contracts and act as an insulating layer between them and the cold realities of global politics (what’s written on paper is only as good as your ability to enforce it, or ignore it). In its earliest stages, the financial stakes are likely to be small and not well understood in terms of their national economic and security implications, so it is unlikely that the federal government would “go to the mat” to defend the interests of a small (somewhat experimental) business.

But when taking the long-view (that of any serious investor), if that same government’s own right of access to and use of some extraterrestrial resource were threatened, the full weight of that government’s various assets would be brought to bear on a resolution of that threat (or whose mere presence would short-circuit outside agression to begin with). This is one reason why the utilization of space resources – an activity critical to the long-term future of humanity in space – is not only an appropriate activity for the federal civil space program, it is an essential one, in anticipation of and in parallel with private development of these resources. Right now, we are uncertain just how difficult it is to extract and use space resources for a variety of applications. In short, this activity is an engineering research and development effort. This is exactly what NASA was established to do – to determine if space-related activities and technologies are possible and if they are, to then encourage the private sector to engage in such activities, using the results of government-funded research to grow their investments and expand our economy.

So while I applaud this bipartisan effort to legally endorse the principle of space resource utilization, it is not sufficient. Instead of pursuing wasteful public relations stunts designed to convince the public that we are on our way to Mars, NASA should instead work on understanding how the material and energy resources of near-Earth space – particularly the water at the poles of the Moon – can be used to create new spacefaring capability. The federal government should do this because the creation of routine access to cislunar space is important to our national strategic and commercial interests. It is also vital to establish our national rights and obligations within the world spacefaring community. U.S. commercial space companies will be there once they know that their nation’s leaders understand the stakes involved and are ready to lead on this new frontier.

Posted in Lunar development, space industry, space policy, space technology, Space transportation | 12 Comments